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NIANG V. GONZALES,
422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005)
FACTS
Petitioner Awa Niang was born in Senegal in 1970 into the Tukulor
Fulani tribe.' According to her account, it was the practice of the tribe for
girls to be subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) and to consummate
2their arranged marriages by age 12. In accordance with her tribal customs,
she was to be subjected to FGM and was promised in marriage to her cousin,
who already had three other wives.3 Petitioner refused to consummate her
marriage and her family acquiesced until she was almost 25. 4 When she still
refused at this later age, however, her family removed her clothes, beat her
and burned her with a hot iron.5 They then performed FGM on her, "so that
[she] wouldn't be able to commit adultery and so that no one would want to
have anything to do with [her]."6 Petitioner left her house the next morning,
staying at a friend's house for the next four years.' She obtained her law
license at the university and then came to the United States in 1999, where
she did not seek asylum but entered as a nonimmigrant visitor.8 While in the
United States, petitioner married and later divorced Elhadji Fall, due to the
fact that they could not have normal sexual relations because of her FGM.9
During her marriage she received a letter from a Senegalese friend stating
that her family considered her an adulteress and would kill her if she
returned. ' 0
The INS initiated removal proceedings against Niang, and the
immigration judge (IJ) found her to be removable." She subsequently
requested either asylum, 12 restriction on removal, 13 relief from removal
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 14 or voluntary departure.15
I Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1191 (2005).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1191-92.







12 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2001) (setting out requirements and procedures for a grant of asylum).
13 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3) (2001) (excepting removal to countries where the alien's life or freedom
would be in jeopardy).
14 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (prohibiting the return
of an alien to a country where it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured).
15 8 U.S.C. § 229c (allowing voluntary departure as an alternative to deportation proceedings).
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The IJ denied her petitions for asylum, restriction on removal, and
relief under the CAT because he disbelieved Niang's account of the
circumstances surrounding the FGM. 16  Niang appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) who affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the
appeal, noting that she had not demonstrated that the IJ's ruling was clearly
erroneous.' 7 Niang appealed this decision on the basis that (1) the BIA erred
in affirming the IJ's adverse credibility finding and (2) her undisputed genital
mutilation constitutes past persecution on account of membership in a social
group however it occurred. 
18
HOLDING
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of relief under
Convention Against Torture. 19 However, the court reversed the decision of
the BIA with respect to asylum and restriction on removal, and remanded the
case back to the BIA.2 °
ANALYSIS
Noting that the BIA's decision demanded particularly high deference,
the court used the substantial evidence standard of review. 21 First the court
examined the requirements to obtain asylum and restriction on removal.22
The relevant statute for asylum provides two ways to meet the
refugee status requirement: basing a claim on past persecution or on a well-
founded fear of future persecution.23  This case focused on Section
1208.13(b)(1) of the Code of Federal Regulations, which addresses past
persecution.24 Essentially, if an applicant can prove past persecution in the
applicant's country of nationality, he or she shall be found a refugee.25
16 Niang, 422 F.3d at 1193.
1 Id.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 1202.
20 Id.
2" Id. at 1196.
22 Id. at 1194-96.
23 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) (2001) (setting these two options as exclusive ways to establish
refugee status).
24 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(2001) ("An applicant shall be found to be a refugee on the basis of
past persecution if the applicant can establish that he or she has suffered persecution in the past in the
applicant's country of nationality [on one of the forbidden grounds].... and is unable or unwilling to
return to, or avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country owing to such persecution").
25 Id.
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Refugee status does not guarantee the grant of asylum, however, as that
decision remains in the Attorney General's discretion.26
The court then examined the restrictions on removal. According to
the relevant statute, to obtain a restriction on removal, an applicant must
show that his "life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of
the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion., 27 The statute further states that if the applicant
has suffered past persecution in his or her country because of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, it
will be presumed that the applicant's life or freedom would be threatened on
return to his or her natural country.28
Both asylum and restriction on removal may be granted under the
claim of past persecution.29 In order for FGM to be the basis of a claim of
past persecution, the applicant must establish that 1) the FGM constituted
persecution; 2) the applicant belonged to a particular social group; and 3)
there was a nexus between the FGM and membership in the group. 30 The
court found that although the BIA disbelieved Niang's accounts of how the
FGM occurred, she could still be entitled to relief, if she could show that
women of the Tukulor Fulani tribe constitute a social group and that she was
subjected to FGM because she belonged to that particular social group.3'
The court found the term "social group" in the statute was ambiguous, and
deferred to the BIA's analysis in In re Acosta.32  According to Acosta,
persecution is
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group
of persons all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some
26 Niang, 422 F.3d at 1195 (citing In re Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987)) (finding that
an alien is a refugee does no more than establish that the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of
the Attorney General).
27 Niang, 422 F.3d at 1194 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2001)) (excepting instances of
deportation).
28 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1) (2001) (explaining that evidence of past persecution will be
presumptive of future persecution).
29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2001) (naming past persecution as grounds for asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3) (2001) (establishing a presumptive entitlement to restriction on removal on basis of past
persecution).
'o Niang,422F.3dat 1197.
31 Id. at 1201.
32 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (1985). In Acosta, the BIA denied an appeal for
asylum and withholding of deportation because Acosta failed to meet the requirement of a social group.
Id. at 234. He based his claim on the fact that he was a taxi driver in San Salvador who refused to
participate in guerrilla-sponsored work stoppages, which lead to threats of violence. Id. However,
because his membership in the group of taxi drivers was something Acosta had the power to change, he
did not meet the standards of a social group. Id.
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circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership...
[W]hatever the common characteristic that defines the
group, it must be one that the members of the group either
cannot change, or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences.
33
Thus, the Tenth Circuit now joins five other circuits in adopting BIA's
interpretation in Acosta.34
Applying these guidelines, the Niang court found that female
members of a tribe would constitute a social group. 35 The court rejected the
contention that the decision proffered in In re Kasinga,z6 where the BIA
demanded an additional element, namely that the social group must include
only those persons who oppose the offensive practice.37 Accordingly, the
court held that opposition is not necessary when the social group is otherwise
defined by gender and tribal membership.
38
Next, membership in the social group must be the reason for the
victim's persecution. 39 The court reemphasized the point that opposition to
the FGM did not need to be proven to establish a nexus.4° In this way, the
Niang court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in Mohammed v. Gonzales,41
31 Id. at 233.
34 Niang, 422 F.3d at 1199; see, e.g., Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1990) (holding
that being a cheesemaker in El Salvador without other evidence of persecution from local guerillas does
not support a finding of well-founded fear of persecution); Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396-97 (1st
Cir. 2004) (holding that it would be unsound policy to recognize Haitians who have committed crimes in
the U.S. as a social group, in light of Haiti's policy of detaining and punishing such persons upon return to
the country); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that Iranian women who so
oppose national laws that they are willing to suffer the consequences of noncompliance constituted a
social group); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546-48 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Acosta
definition but holding that "tattooed youths" were not a social group); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512
(7th Cir. 1998) (using the Acosta standard and holding that parents of Burmese dissidents did not
comprise a social group); Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1184-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(finding that an individual family constituted a social group as they were subject to physical violence and
intimidation because of their relation to the racist father-in-law).
" Id. at 1200.
36 In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (1996). In Kasinga, the BIA granted asylum to a young
woman from the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Tongo. Id. at 358. The board found that young
women who are members of this tribe and have not been subjected to FGM as practiced by the tribe, and
who oppose the practice, are recognized as a social group within the definition of "refugee" in 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(42)(A) (1994). Id. at 365.
" Niang, 422 F.3d at 1200.
38 Id.
39 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2001) supra note 24 and accompanying text ( ); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3) (2001) supra note 13 and accompanying text (
40 Niang, 422 F.3d at 1201.
41 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (2005). In Mohammed, the court granted the petitioner's
application to reopen her asylum claim because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 802. Her
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which held that a female victim of FGM had established past persecution on
the basis of being a member of a social group as defined solely by her
membership in the tribe and her gender.42 Recognizing that the reason for
the persecution was a result of her sex and tribal membership and not
opposition to the practice, the Niang court justified such a holding.43
Applying the foregoing analysis to Niang's case, the Tenth Circuit
found that although the court would defer to the BIA's rejection of Niang's
claim of past persecution because he found her account unbelievable, her
broader claim that she suffered FGM on the basis of her social group could
nonetheless afford her relief.44 Although the BIA did not find Niang's
account of how the FGM took place credible, it remained undisputed that it
did take place and that she was a female member of the Tukulor Fulani
tribe.45 Thus, the court remanded the case for consideration of the broader
claim of "social group. 4 6 Niang must then show that the persecutor was the
government or a force that the government was unable or unwilling to
control.47 According to the court, if the BIA finds this third element of
refugee status, Niang is considered a refugee, entitled to a presumption for
asylum purposes that she has a well-founded fear of future harm on account
of her social group and a presumption for restriction-on-removal purposes
that she will be persecuted in her home country on account of her social
group.,
48
Finally, the prohibition of return under the CAT requires that the
alien show that the persecution upon return to the country would be so severe
as to rise to the level of torture.49 Under the CAT, future torture is not
presumed on the basis of past torture. 50  The court affirmed the BIA's
determination that Niang was not eligible for relief under the CAT because
evidence of past torture does not presumptively entitle an applicant to
attorney had neglected to use evidence of past infliction of FGM in her asylum claim. Id. at 789-90. The
court found that being a female member of the Benadiri Clan of Somalia was sufficient to meet the
requirements of "social group," stating "[w]e believe that opposition is not required in order to meet the
'on account of' prong in female genital mutilation cases. The persecution at issue in these cases-the
forcible, painful cutting of a female's body parts-is not a result of a woman's opposition to the practice
but rather a result of her sex and her clan membership and/or nationality." Id. at 797.





47 Id. at 1201-02.
48 Id. at 1202.
49 Id. at 1196 (citing Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004)) (noting that a
person is entitled not to be removed to a certain country if he or she can show that it is more likely than
not that he or she would be tortured if removed to that country).
'o Id. at 1196.
12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
relief.5 Although past persecution is one factor for the BIA to consider in
his CAT decision, the BIA discredited Niang's description of her family's
attack on her and it was rational for the BIA to find that she would not be
killed or subjected to torture if she returned to Senegal.
5 2
CONCLUSION
The Niang court noted two outliers in circuit interpretations of
"social groups." However, it seems that both Safaie v. INSSS and Gomez v.
INS54 may be reconciled with the Niang decision. In Safaie the court held
that Safaie's assertion of a social group as defined by all Iranian women was
overbroad, "because no factfinder could reasonably conclude that all Iranian
women had a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on their
gender." 55  Conversely, the court stated that if it could find a group of
women who refused to conform to a practice and that their opposition was in
the face of severe consequences, the group would satisfy the definition of a
social group. 56  In other words, if Safaie had contended that she was
persecuted because she was part of a group of female political dissidents, and
had sufficient evidence to show the extent of her involvement and
subsequent persecution, the court likely would have found a "social group."
Safaie's proposed "social group" was too broad. In Niang, of course,
opposition to FGM was not an issue because it was not a cause of the
persecution, FGM itself.
Gomez, like Safaie, may be factually distinguished from Niang. In
Gomez, the court found against an applicant for asylum when she based her
persecution claim on the social group of "women who have been previously
battered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas. '5 7 Noting that the attributes of
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994). In Safaie, the court denied the petitioner's
application for asylum based on her fear of punishment for violating Iran's gender-specific laws. Id. at
640. As a university student, she had been subject to long interrogations and threats of harm. Id. at 639.
Stating that it was unwilling to hold that all Iranian women deserve refugee status and that her objection to
Iranian policies was not strong enough to create a more specific social group encompassing only Iranian
female activists, the court denied that being a female in Iran constituted a social group. Id. at 640.
54 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). In Gomez, the petitioner was repeatedly raped and
beaten as a child by guerilla forces in her homeland of El Salvador. Id. at 662. The court held that it
would not recognize women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas,
because this group of individuals did not share a fundamental characteristic which served to distinguish
them in the eyes of a persecutor. Id. at 663-64. The court also stated that "[p]ossession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a
particular group." Id. at 664.
ss Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
56 Id.
57 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663-64.
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the social group must be discrete, the court held that "possession of broadly-
based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular group."58 This decision may be
reconciled with Niang, however, when considering the factual differences of
the cases. While Niang was targeted because she was a female member of
the Tukulor Fulani tribe in Senegal, the victim in Gomez was targeted
because she was a female living in El Salvador. In other words, Niang's
social group was defined both by tribe and gender, while Gomez's relied
solely on gender. It would seem that the court in Gomez saw a lack of
specificity which translated into a lack of probable persecution upon return to
El Salvador. While being a female in the Tukulor Fulani tribe created a 20%
chance of being subjected to FGM,59 the percentage of women in El
Salvador who were attacked had not been determined. Thus, the Gomez
court seemed to read an element of substantive probability in determining
what constituted a "social group."
A similar Sixth Circuit decision could also be seen to reject the
notion that gender and clan membership alone would meet the requirements
of a social group, but may be better understood as setting specific limitations
on such a definition of social group. In Rreshpja v. Gonzales,6° the Sixth
Circuit held that being an attractive woman who risked being kidnapped and
forced into prostitution upon her return to Albania could not constitute a
social group. 61 The Rreshpja court distinguished these facts from those of
Mohammed because in Mohammed, the applicant presented evidence that 80
percent of all females were victims of FGM in Somalia, 62 while petitioner in
Rreshpja did not show concrete evidence that young women in Albania were
forced into prostitution as pervasively. 63 Thus, like Gomez, Rreshpja seems
to set out a substantive evaluation of the proposed social group, specifically
in terms of the probability of being affected by the objectionable practice.
This view of the requirements of "social group," however, seems to impinge
on the next requirement in the refugee status evaluation, namely a showing
that the applicant would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear of
5" Id. at 664.
'9 Niang, 422 F.3d at 1193.
60 Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2005). In Rreshpja, the petitioner fraudulently
obtained a non-immigrant visa after a man attempted to kidnap her in her home country of Albania. Id at
553. She alleged that she was at risk of prosecution because she was likely to be kidnapped and forced
into prostitution if she returned to her country. Id. The court found that young, attractive Albanian
females did not constitute a social group under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) and denied her asylum. Id. at
556. The court noted that it would not recognize generalized and sweeping classifications to meet the
requirements of social group, nor could a social group be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers
persecution. Id. 556-57.
61 Id. at 555.
62 Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 801.
63 Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 555-56.
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persecution based on membership in the social group. Rreshpja may not
present a directly contrary ruling to Niang, but it did set a more restrictive
substantive standard on who may constitute a social group.
Examining this case law, the Niang decision is the latest in several
similar holdings by the other circuits which have broadened the understood
meaning of "social group." This represents a recent acceptance by the courts
to recognize sex as forming the basis for a social group, therefore taking a
broad reading of Acosta. It also reflects changing philosophy within the INS.
Beginning in 1995, the INS started an initiative which included a directive to
Asylum Officers to consider gender-based claims within the framework of
existing international human rights instruments, such as United Nations
guidelines. 64  Such guidelines prescribed a broader understanding of
persecution, as it was implicated by gender-based claims. The trend to adopt
more liberal interpretations of sexual persecution will serve to bring
American asylum policies in line with internationally-accepted standards.
The broad interpretation given to Acosta in Niang will have the effect
of giving broader asylum and restriction on removal protection to those
facing prosecution because of their gender. The Niang court has joined
others in agreeing that objection to a particular practice is not a requirement
in defining "social group." Women who suffer persecution through FGM,
for example, are rarely targeted because of their individual beliefs, as
opposed to their gender, and this decision will lessen the burden for these
victims to meet the "social group" requirement for asylum. This also holds
true for women seeking asylum from particularly gender-oppressive
societies, in which women are targeted without regard to political or
ideological affiliation. There will likely be greater consistency in IJ and BIA
decisions regarding classifications of social groups as circuits continue to
agree on this interpretation. Finally, these recent holdings also have the
potential to broaden protection even further, to include those who, for
example, face persecution because of sexual orientation.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Amy McCarthy
See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women as documents to be consulted in deciding gender-based claims).
